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Imagine that you need to decide whether to adopt a child or not. It’s the only avenue to 
parenthood that is open to you. If you adopt a child, you will become a parent. You will 
experience the (currently unknown) highs and lows of being a parent. If you decide not to 
adopt, you will never know what being a parent is like. The decision you are asked to make is 
doubly risky. 
 
This problem has been discussed recently by philosopher L.A. Paul in her book 
Transformative Experience. Paul suggests that experiences such as becoming a parent (or, 
more fancifully, a vampire!) are doubly transformative. First, they are epistemically 
transformative: you can only learn what it is like to be a parent by becoming one. There is no 
other way to learn what it would be like for you. You might ask other people, read parenting 
blogs, look after a friend’s children, or work as a childcarer. However, Paul claims, none of 
these experiences can tell you what it will be like for you to be a parent. Of course she sets 
the bar for knowledge rather high, but let’s set that aside for now. 
 
Second, experiences such as becoming a parent are existentially transformative: you don’t 
know how such an experience will change you and your preferences. People who become 
parents change in many ways—their values and identity often change in deep ways, and not 
always the ways they expected. Many people express this transformation when they say that 
their priorities changed completely when they became a parent. What seemed important 
before seems less so now; what excited little interest in the past can take on enormous value 
when you are a parent. 
 
When we make a decision rationally, we base it on what we believe and what we value. My 
belief it is going to rain, alongside my valuing being dry more than being unencumbered by 
an umbrella, leads me to choose to take an umbrella when I go outside. But when you are 
deciding whether or not to adopt a child, you don’t know how much you value that 
experience now (because you don’t have the knowledge of what it is like); and you don’t 
know how much you’ll value it when you become a parent (because you don’t know how you 
will be changed by the experience). So, according to Paul, it is impossible for you to make 
the choice to adopt rationally. 
 
Of course, people do make the decision to adopt, or to become parents, all the time. But what 
Paul’s idea of transformative experience captures is how deeply life events can change us and 
how little we may know about particular experiences when we decide to have them. Calling 
an experience transformative means that having the experience will teach us something new 
that we could not have known otherwise, and that the experience will deeply change us. 
 
We suggest that serious illness is a transformative experience and that Paul’s framework 
usefully characterises central aspects of it. First, illness is epistemically transformative: it 
teaches the ill person what it is like to receive a diagnosis; what it is like to experience new 
symptoms. It teaches the ill person what it is like to cope with severe ill health and life-
limiting symptoms, or to undergo medical procedures, such as general anaesthetic and 
surgery. It can also reveal to the ill person, if the prognosis is poor, what it is like to be 
confronted with one’s death in an immediate and pressing manner. 
 
In all of these ways illness is epistemically transformative. It gives us experiences that we 
would not otherwise have had and that we cannot know what it is like to have until we 
undergo them - knowledge that cannot otherwise be acquired. You might watch someone 
faint, or know someone who suﬀers from, say, chronic pain, but that would not give you the 
same knowledge as having these experiences yourself. For example, many health 
professionals who become ill say that nothing in their professional life prepared them for the 
experience of being patients. No matter how extensive their training or clinical experience, 
nothing gives them knowledge of what it is like to be patients themselves, a theme of Robert 
Klitzman’s book, When Doctors Become Patients. 
 
Of course, we engage with illness through others’ experience of it, in our role as carers, say. 
The second- person perspective can compensate for lack of a ﬁrst-person perspective. To 
deeply care for and mourn an ill person’s losses and suﬀering and be intimately acquainted 
with their anguish, needs, and hardship can teach us much about illness. Moreover, reading 
accounts of illness can both edify and inform non-patients about the experience of illness, 
revealing what it is like to live “at the will of the body”, as Arthur Frank puts it. But to know, 
fully and ﬁrst-hand, what it is like to have a serious illness, to experience bodily failure, 
vulnerability, and anxiety about one’s body and one’s life, one needs to have the experience 
itself. Illness, then, is epistemically transformative. 
 
But is illness also existentially transformative? Here, too, we answer in the affirmative. We 
know from literature in health economics, health psychology, and qualitative health research 
that people rate health states diﬀerently depending on whether they are in them or not. People 
with serious health conditions, ranging from paraplegia to renal failure and cancer, 
consistently rank their wellbeing higher than healthy controls asked to imagine what living in 
a particular health state would be like and to provide a ranking for that state. So sighted 
people think that living with blindness is worse than blind people think it is. People without 
diabetes think that living with diabetes is worse than people with diabetes say it actually is, 
and so on. This empirical evidence supports our claim that illness is doubly transformative: 
we don’t know what it would be like to live with a particular illness and we don’t know how 
we will change in the process. 
 
People living with ill health do not average as high scores of wellbeing as healthy people, but 
slightly lower. This may lead us to think that ill people are not entirely unaﬀected by their 
health condition, but have learned to live with it. Although not oblivious to their losses or 
struggles, they nonetheless learned to live well within the conﬁnes of their illness. Around the 
time of diagnosis or symptom appearance people experience a substantial reduction in 
wellbeing, but return to slightly below baseline levels within a year or two. This adaptation 
explains why what seems to the outside observer like a terrible catastrophe is manageable 
and, moreover, something to which the person with the illness adapts. We also, therefore, 
suggest that this process of adaptation captures the existential transformation people undergo 
when they fall ill. The adaptation process takes time, during which wellbeing levels drop; but 
when complete, the ill person recovers her sense of wholeness and wellness, having adapted 
to her condition. She has been transformed by the process in ways that are surprising, 
informative, and potentially instructive for health professionals. 
 
In what ways does illness transform people? We know that people experience a dramatic shift 
in their identity; for example, patients with cancer who recover view themselves as 
“survivors”. Many pathographies detail how people have changed when they emerge from an 
illness episode, sometimes dramatically. The values and desires of ill people can alter. They 
may slow down or speed up, reconsider their career, or want to spend more time with their 
family; they might ﬁnd new meaning in work or as a volunteer, and they may value time and 
simply living in the present more highly. Goals and ambitions are often updated, taking into 
account the limitations and opportunities brought about by illness, perhaps becoming more 
focused on what is still possible. Their world-view may change deeply. They may become 
depressed, or more religious, or happier. And, of course, they may not change at all. There is 
simply no telling how illness may change a person, which is precisely Paul’s point. 
 
So, how does this change our view of informed consent, risk assessment, advance directives, 
and other decision- making junctures in a patient’s health-care journey? How do you discuss 
possible future outcomes for a current patient, knowing full well that she may be quite a 
diﬀerent person by the time these outcomes unfold? How can we ask a patient to choose a 
course of action in the present when we know that the future patient will be transformed by 
their illness experience in unanticipated ways? And how do prevailing conceptions of the 
nature of illness aﬀect how a person is transformed - for instance, if a suﬀusing ideology of 
“positive thinking” presents only the positively transforming eﬀects of illness, and obscures 
more negative possibilities, as critics like Barbara Ehrenreich worry? 
 
Our suggestion is that, ﬁrst, we should appreciate the transformative nature of illness and 
introduce this element of increased uncertainty when discussing options and future scenarios 
with patients. Second, the notion of adaptation can be used to alleviate concerns about a life 
with a disability or long-term illness. We can share with patients the evidence showing that 
most people living with a chronic condition adapt to it and continue to live meaningful and 
(mostly) happy lives with it, even if they are unwilling to believe this at the time of diagnosis. 
Third, the notion of transformative experience can be used as a springboard for discussions 
about putative futures - reducing the certainty opens the door to more uncertainty, but also to 
the possibility of imagining a fulﬁlling life which is not socially scripted or the life the patient 
has wanted, but could nonetheless be a rich and satisfying life. 
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